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Abstract:        In the U.S., flood insurance is provided essentially through the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP), a public-private program established in 1968. In the past 10 years, the program has radically 
expanded to cover $1.1 trillion in assets today.  
       This paper provides a detailed analysis of the largest flood insurance sample ever studied by 
focusing on the state of Florida, which accounts for 40 percent of the entire NFIP portfolio. We study 
the demand for flood insurance with a database of more than 7.5 million flood policies-in-force for the 
years 2000-2005, and all the claims filed in Florida during that period.  
       We answer four questions: What are the characteristics of the buyers of flood insurance? What types 
of contracts (deductibles and coverage levels) are purchased? Where and when are claims paid and to 
what extent does mitigation work? How are prices determined and how much does NFIP insurance cost? 
      Given the recent significant increase in the cost of catastrophes worldwide and the debate about the 
role that insurance can play to enhance adaptation to climate change, the responses to these questions 
shall be of interest to other countries too.  
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1. Introduction 
The economic costs of natural disasters have risen dramatically over the past several 
decades. In the 1950s, damages from natural disasters worldwide were $53.6 billion, and by the 
1990s, they had risen to $778.3 billion (Munich Re, 2008). The year 2008 alone inflicted $200 
billion in direct economic damages from natural catastrophes worldwide, the third most costly 
year ever.  
This growth in damages from natural disasters has made the question of how to manage 
catastrophe risk more salient and has attracted the attention of policymakers and scholars alike. 
Such radical changes in the rhythm and scale of disasters highlight the necessity of developing 
adequate and sustainable financial protection for potential victims of future disasters. Insurance 
has typically played a key role in providing financial protection against catastrophes. And insured 
losses have been growing along with total damages. Looking at insured losses only, of the 25 
most costly insured losses over the period 1970–2008, 14 occurred since 2001, 13 of which were 
in the United States (Swiss Re, 2008a, b). We have now entered a new era of catastrophes.  
Within the spectrum of natural hazards, floods are of particular concern because, during 
the 20th century in the United States, they accounted for the most lives lost and the most 
property damage of all natural disasters (Perry, 2000). In the United States, standard multiperil 
homeowners insurance policies are normally required as a condition for a mortgage. These 
policies cover damage from fire, wind, hail, lightning, and winter storms, among other common 
noncatastrophe perils. Coverage for flood damage resulting from rising water is explicitly 
excluded in homeowners insurance policies, but coverage for these losses has been available 
through the federally managed National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) since 1968.  
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Federal law requires property owners in 100-year floodplains—referred to as Special 
Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs)—with  a mortgage from a federally backed or regulated lender to 
purchase flood insurance; yet the effectiveness of this requirement in practice has been 
questioned as take-up rates have been found to be quite low in many places across the country. 
For example, after a 1998 flood in northern Vermont, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) found that 84 percent of residents in SFHAs did not have insurance, even 
though 45 percent of these uninsured residents were required to purchase this coverage (Tobin 
and Calfee, 2005). Hurricane Katrina in 2005 again revealed lower-than-expected take-up rates 
for flood insurance.1 Lack of nationwide data on the number of properties in floodplains, 
however, makes a complete assessment of NFIP market penetration difficult. Two recent studies 
attempt to fill the gap. The first finds that, in a sample of coastal areas, 49 percent of eligible 
properties participated in the NFIP (Kriesel and Landry, 2004). A 2006 RAND report estimates 
that about 49 percent of properties in SFHAs purchased NFIP flood insurance, and only 1 
percent of properties outside SFHAs purchased insurance, even though one-third of NFIP 
policies are outside SFHAs (Dixon et al., 2006). The RAND estimates represent a national 
average that masks high regional variation; take-up rates are much lower in some parts of the 
country, such as the Midwest.  
Despite these concerns about take-up rates, very little research has empirically examined 
homeowners’ demand for flood insurance. Browne and Hoyt (2000) provide the first empirical 
analysis. In spite of its important contribution to the field, the state-level aggregation of the data 
limits the interpretation of the results for decisionmaking at an individual level.  In this paper, we 
                                                 
1 In the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina, the percentage of homeowners with flood insurance ranged from 
57.7 percent in St. Bernard’s to 7.3 percent in Tangipahoa. Only 40 percent of the residents in Orleans parish had 
flood insurance (Hartwig and Wilkinson, 2005). These low percentages are particularly striking because the NFIP 
requires that homes located in SFHAs purchase insurance as a condition for federally backed mortgages. 
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extend the empirical work on the market for flood insurance by providing a detailed analysis of 
the demand for NFIP insurance in the state of Florida. We draw on a unique database of all NFIP 
flood insurance policies issued in the state over six consecutive years (2000–2005); this amounts 
to more than 7.5 million policies. We chose to focus our analysis on the state of Florida because 
it has become a world-peak zone for disaster financing and also because it has—at around 40 
percent—by far the largest share of policies of the entire NFIP. We use the data to answer four 
specific questions about flood insurance demand in Florida: (1) What are the characteristics of 
the buyers of flood insurance? (2) What type of contracts (deductibles and coverage levels) are 
purchased? (3) Where and when are claims paid? (4) How are prices determined and how much 
does NFIP insurance cost?   
We find that most NFIP policies in Florida are for single-family, residential properties. 
Just as the program overall is concentrated in only a few states, policies in Florida are highly 
concentrated in a few counties. The majority of policies are located within 100-year floodplains, 
but a sizable percentage of property owners nevertheless insure outside of these areas. The NFIP 
places a limit on the amount of coverage property owners can purchase, but in Florida, about 75 
percent of homeowners insure below this limit. Most homeowners insure both their home and its 
contents, but about 13 percent do not insure their contents at all. However, these state-level 
averages mask variations across counties.  
On contract choices, we find that 98 percent of customers chose a deductible lower than 
the maximum available, and almost 80 percent of policyholders chose the lowest possible 
deductible (i.e., $500) in 2005. Our results on deductible choices are consistent with the literature 
on other insurance markets, albeit much more pronounced than previous work and based here on 
the largest sample ever studied. We also find, interestingly, that deductible choice varies with 
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flood zone, with more homeowners in the riskiest areas—where the mandatory purchase 
requirement applies—choosing a higher deductible. Not many individuals appear to insure only 
catastrophes, as those at the limit of coverage are more likely to choose the lowest possible 
deductible. As anticipated, we also find that people have reacted to the 2004 floods in Florida by 
choosing a lower deductible and higher limit then they previously did.  
An analysis of the determinants of claims payments finds that claims are higher in 100-
year floodplains and lower when a property is elevated, has more than one floor, or has a 
basement. The analysis also confirms that claims are lower in communities that have undertaken 
flood mitigation activities. Finally, we find that the average premium per policy and per $1,000 
of coverage in Florida is among the lowest in the nation, which is somewhat counterintuitive 
given the storm surge exposure in this state. This can be explained by the fact that NFIP 
premiums are set for each flood zone nationally and do not vary by state or locality so variations 
in price reflect variations who is purchasing policies. Furthermore, a recent U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that the NFIP rate-setting process uses out-of-date 
data (GAO, 2008a). This might be even more pronounced in Florida given the fast urban 
development that has occurred there over the past 30 years.  
The next section of the paper provides an overview of aspects of the NFIP program that 
are relevant to the analysis we conduct in this study. Section 2 also provides a cross-state 
comparison of several metrics of the NFIP to put our analysis of Florida in a national context. 
Section 3 systematically addresses each of the four questions above. Finally, section 4 concludes 
and offers some policy recommendations for improving the NFIP. 
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2. History of the National Flood Insurance Program and Cross-State Comparisons 
Creation of the NFIP 
The NFIP grew out of a widespread belief among private insurance companies that flood 
peril was not insurable. It was argued in the United States that floods could not be insured by the 
private sector because: (1) only particular areas are subject to the risk, and as such, adverse 
selection would be a problem; (2) the premiums necessary would be so high that no one would 
be willing to pay them; and (3) flood losses can be catastrophic, that is, enough premiums could 
not be collected to cover catastrophic events (Overman, 1957; Gerdes, 1963; Anderson, 1974). 
This concern culminated in the passage of the NFIP in 1968 following major floods that 
demonstrated the lack of coverage in many hazardous areas. It was thought that a government 
program could potentially be successful because it might pool risks more broadly, have funds to 
jumpstart the program, subsidize existing homeowners while charging actuarial rates to new 
construction, and tie insurance to land-use changes that might lower risks (Grossman, 1958). The 
program would also have the capacity to spread losses over time thanks to the potential for the 
program to borrow money from the federal government to compensate for a punctual deficit, 
something private insurers cannot do.  
 
Flood Risk Designations 
To set premiums and support local governments, the NFIP maps participating 
communities, designating flood risks through different flood zones. These maps are called Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). A building that was in place pre-FIRM—before the mapping of 
flood risk was completed in that area—is given subsidized rates.2 New constructions built after 
                                                 
2 The subsidy applies only to the first $35,000 of coverage on the building and $10,000 on contents, although the 
mean and median claims in 2004 were below these limits (CBO, 2007).  
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the risk mapping has been made public are charged actuarial rates. The expectation was that 
fewer policies would be subsidized over time. However, around a quarter of properties are still 
subsidized today since the housing stock is turning over more slowly than predicted, partly 
because of new construction and renovation techniques that have extended the life of buildings 
(Pasterick, 1998; Wetmore et al., 2006; CBO, 2007).3  
Although it constitutes a declining percentage of all NFIP policies, the number of 
properties receiving subsidized premium rates has grown since 1985; by 2007 it was at its 
highest point in almost 30 years (GAO, 2008b). Of particular relevance to Florida, the 
Congressional Budget Office found that many subsidized properties in coastal areas (23 percent 
of their sample of 10,000 properties) were second homes, vacation homes, or rentals (CBO, 
2007).4  
The analysis in this paper is based on the risk estimates (in the form of designated flood 
zones) from FEMA FIRMs. There is some question about the accuracy of these maps, however. 
Flood risks are not stationary. Development that reduces impervious surface area can increase 
flooding, as can the engineering of rivers (e.g., Criss and Shock, 2001) and possibly climate 
change. A recent GAO study reveals that many FIRMs are out of date, and thus the maps can 
severely underestimate the true risk (GAO, 2008a)5. FEMA has begun a map modernization 
program to correct this problem. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Subsidized properties only become required to pay actuarial rates when they are damaged at half the property value 
or are improved, creating an increase in value of 50 percent (CBO, 2007).  
4 For more on the effects of eliminating NFIP subsidies, see PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999). 
5 This was also found by Temple University researchers who undertook a detailed analysis of the Pennypack Creek 
Watershed in Pennsylvania and found that their assessment designated more 100-year floodplains than the existing 
FIRM (Center for Sustainable Communities, 2006).  
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Operation of the NFIP 
The NFIP was originally designed as a voluntary partnership between the federal 
government and communities: local governments enacted floodplain management regulations; in 
exchange, property owners in participating communities were eligible for federal flood 
insurance.6 To encourage further mitigation, the NFIP runs the Community Rating System 
(CRS), which is a voluntary program that rewards communities that undertake mitigating 
activities with lower premiums.  
 The majority of NFIP policies are written through the Write-Your-Own (WYO) Program. 
The WYO program allows participating property/casualty insurance companies to write and 
service NFIP’s standard flood insurance policy in their own names. The insurance companies 
bear no risk and are compensated for writing policies and settling claims, while the federal 
government benefits from the private industry’s marketing channels and the presence of many 
insurers in participating communities. Nearly all of the flood policies issued today are written by 
companies that write flood insurance through the WYO program (99 percent in Florida over the 
period 2000–2005).  
Despite this potentially synergistic effort between the NFIP and private companies, take-
up rates for flood insurance have historically been low. One reason is that private insurance 
agents do not seem to market NFIP policies (Anderson, 1974); in addition, individuals are not 
interested in voluntarily purchasing flood insurance because of behavioral biases in evaluating 
low-probability risks and/or a lack of information (Anderson, 1974; Kunreuther, 1979; Power 
and Shows, 1979). Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972 demonstrated to Congress that very few people 
were participating in the NFIP; this led to the passage of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 
1973 (Anderson, 1974; FEMA, 2002). This act limited the federal disaster assistance for 
                                                 
6 For more on the history and functioning of the NFIP, see Pasterick (1998). 
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nonparticipating communities and also created a mandatory purchase requirement: federally 
backed or regulated lenders must require the purchase of flood insurance by anyone taking out a 
mortgage on property acquired or developed in a SFHA. Although this led to a large relative 
increase in policies-in-force, the 1993 floods in the Midwest revealed that the mandatory 
purchase requirement was not being widely enforced, and sanctions on lenders were tightened in 
1994.7  
 As discussed in the introduction, however, it is difficult to determine how well these 
regulations are working because of a lack of nationwide data on the number of properties in 100-
year floodplains (Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Dixon et al., 2006). Despite this important 
limitation, one can look at the absolute evolution of flood insurance coverage over time. The 
combination of FEMA’s attempts to raise awareness regarding the risk of floods and a series of 
major flooding episodes that occurred in 1992–1993 significantly contributed to increasing the 
number of flood policies issued by the NFIP.8 A more significant increase started in 2004 and 
accelerated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and major floods in Louisiana. In December 
2007, 5.65 million policies were in place—almost 700,000 more than were in place in 2005. 
Over the same period, the total value of property insured under the NFIP grew rapidly. Total 
exposure was nearly $214 billion nationwide in 1990 and $568 billion in 2000. In December 
2007, it reached $1.14 trillion and it continues to grow. Not surprisingly, premiums collected for 
flood coverage have significantly increased as well, from $670 million in 1990, to $2.85 billion 
at the end of December 2007.  
                                                 
7 The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 created financial penalties for lenders that did not comply with 
the mandatory purchase requirement, stated that liability is not altered by sale or transfer of the loan, and mandated 
that lenders purchase insurance on behalf of the borrower if the borrower fails to do so. 
8 Three significant flood events in 1992 (a Texas flood, hurricane Andrew, and a Nor’Easter) generated more than 
$500 million in insured losses; a March storm and the floods in the Midwest in 1993 also generated $500 million in 
payments by the NFIP. The Texas floods in October 1994, the Louisiana floods in May 1995, and Hurricane Opal 
cost the NFIP a total of more than $1.2 billion. 
  10
 
Cross-State Comparisons 
  The NFIP does not play the same role in every state. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
coverage and premiums in the top 10 states (ranked by the number of flood policies-in-force) at 
the end of December 2007 using data provided by FEMA. We briefly discuss each item in the 
table. Note that these are average figures that mask important differences within a state 
depending on location, exposure to risk, value of the house, and demographics of the 
homeowner. We will discuss these variables in more detail in the next section of the paper when 
we analyze the Florida market. 
The NFIP market is highly concentrated. Two states—Florida and Texas—represent 
more than 50 percent of the entire number of NFIP policies-in-force. Around 70 percent of 
policies are located in just five states—Florida, Texas, Louisiana, California, and New Jersey.9  
The distribution among the top states remains nearly the same when the dollar value of the 
coverage-in-place is used instead of the number of policies as the measure of the quantity of 
insurance. The top five states account for more than $800 billion of flood coverage, or 71 percent 
of the national figure.  When looking at take-up rates (policies divided by Census population 
estimates from 2000), Florida has one of the highest take-up rates, whereas Texas has a rate that 
is much lower than that of Louisiana, despite having more policies.   
 
                                                 
9 All states have at least some NFIP policies-in-force. The states with the lowest number of policies-in-force, with 
less than 5,000 are: Alaska, District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and 
Wyoming. Total coverage in these states ranges from $226,397,000 in D.C. to $980,648,600 in Utah. The premium 
per policy ranges from $374 in D.C. to $896 in Utah, with most in the $600s. 
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TABLE 1. NFIP SUMMARY STATISTICS WITH A FOCUS ON THE TOP 10 STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 
of flood 
policies in 
place 
Insurance 
penetration 
(policies  
divided by 
2000 
population 
in 100s) 
Quantity of 
insurance in 
place 
($U.S.) 
 
Total 
annual 
premiums 
($U.S.) 
 
Average 
premium 
per 
policy 
Average  
premium 
per $1,000  
of coverage 
 
Average 
quantity of 
insurance 
per policy 
        
Nation 5,554,041 1.97% 1,120,767,708,600 2,810,863,345 $506 $2.51 $201,793 
        
Florida 2,189,759 13.70% 454,409,776,100 901,071,362 $411 $1.98 $207,516 
% nationwide 39.43%  40.54% 32.06%  
        
Texas 666,920 3.20% 145,170,577,200 279,895,243 $420 $1.93 $217,673
% nationwide 12.01%  12.95% 9.96%  
        
Louisiana 502,085 11.23% 93,608,829,200 286,015,533 $570 $3.06 $186,440
% nationwide 9.04%  8.35% 10.18%  
        
California 266,171 0.79% 62,041,065,600 168,952,788 $635 $2.72 $233,087
% nationwide 4.79%  5.54% 6.01%  
        
New Jersey 223,650 2.66% 45,945,494,500 159,123,884 $711 $3.46 $205,435
% nationwide 4.03%  4.10% 5.66%  
        
TOP 5 STATES 3,848,585 4.60% 801,175,742,600 1,795,058,810 $466 $2.24 $208,174
% nationwide 69.29%  71.48% 63.86%  
        
South Carolina 197,334 4.92% 43,090,182,300 101,117,712 $512 $2.35 $218,362
% nationwide 3.55%  3.84% 3.60%  
        
New York 144,253 0.76% 31,598,332,600 109,182,682 $757 $3.46 $219,048
% nationwide 2.60%  2.82% 3.88%   
        
North Carolina 133,955 1.66% 28,618,309,100 74,043,712 $553 $2.59 $213,641
% nationwide 2.41%  2.55% 2.63%   
        
Virginia 105,860 1.50% 23,137,990,700 57,149,668 $540 $2.47 $218,572
% nationwide 1.91%  2.06% 2.03%   
        
Georgia 88,429 1.08% 19,465,735,700 49,644,456 $561 $2.55 $220,128
% nationwide 1.59%  1.74% 1.77%   
        
TOP 10 
STATES 4,518,416 
 
3.48% 947,086,293,000 
    
2,186,197,040 $484 $2.31 $209,606
% nationwide 81.35%  84.50% 77.78%  
Sources: Authors’ calculation from FEMA data as of December 31, 2007. 
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With a high take-up rate and total number of policies, Florida represents about one-third 
of the total $2.81 billion in premiums collected by the NFIP nationwide. As discussed in section 
4 in more detail, prices for NFIP insurance are set nationally and vary only by flood zone and 
characteristics of the house. They do not vary by state or locality, so the numbers reported here 
reflect the variety in flood risk by state, variation in the composition of who buys insurance, and 
of course, how much coverage is bought per policy—a function of the value of homes.  Finally, 
the average quantity of insurance coverage per policy varies somewhat by state from the national 
average of $202,000. In December 2007, it ranged from $186,000 in Louisiana to $233,000 in 
California. 
 
3. Analysis of the Flood Insurance Market in the State of Florida 
With more than 40 percent of the policies-in-force in the United States, Florida offers a 
natural setting to better understand the functioning of the NFIP and the characteristics of 
homeowners who choose to buy flood coverage. Moreover, the state is highly exposed to 
hurricane risks and has the greatest concentration of exposed value in high-risk areas; Florida is 
thus of particular interest to many policymakers. 
In this section, we answer four questions regarding flood insurance in Florida: (1) What 
are the characteristics of the buyers of flood insurance? (2) What type of contracts (coverage 
levels and deductibles) are purchased? (3) Where and when are claims paid? (4) How are prices 
determined and how much does NFIP insurance cost? 
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To answer these questions we compiled data from several sources. The first is a dataset of 
more than 7.5 million flood insurance policies provided to us by the NFIP.10 It includes all of the 
policies-in-force in Florida for six consecutive years (2000–2005): more than 1.21 million 
policies in 2000, 1.24 million in 2001, 1.26 million in 2002 and 2003, 1.29 million in 2004, and 
1.37 million in 2005. The dataset excludes identifying information of the homeowner, preventing 
us from doing a household-level analysis, but it does have the zip code, city, and county in which 
the policyholder is located. The dataset contains a variety of variables relating to the policy, such 
as the coverage level, premium, and deductible. The dataset also has the flood zone, the CRS 
number, and the type of policy (e.g., single-family or commercial).  
 From the NFIP, we also received a claims dataset that contains all claims filed in Florida 
through August 31, 2006, excluding identifying information. It includes information on the 
claim, such as the date of the loss, the catastrophe with which it is associated, the amount of 
damage, and how much was paid. It also contains information for a subset of the policies on the 
house and contents associated with the claim, such as structural features of the house and the 
value of the house and contents.  
 Finally, we also drew on data from the 2000 U.S. Census. This gave us county-level 
demographic information, such as median income and median value of owner-occupied housing. 
Although these figures have certainly evolved since 2000, they are the most recently available 
Census data. We used such measures to better understand the factors driving the decision to 
purchase insurance. 
 
 
                                                 
10 We are indebted to Tim Scoville and Ed Pasterick for sharing this dataset and the claims dataset for the purpose of 
our research project and for the many discussions we had together on the practical operation of the program over the 
past several years. 
  14
3.1. What are the characteristics of the buyers of flood insurance in Florida? 
Occupancy Type 
The majority of flood policies in Florida (more than 80 percent) are for single-family, 
residential properties (Table 2). The remaining policies are either for multiple-family homes or 
other residential coverage (e.g., mobile homes). Only about four percent of policies-in-force are 
nonresidential (e.g., commercial). For that reason, the majority of our analyses in the rest of the 
paper will focus on single-family, residential properties. The number of such policies in Florida 
has increased from around 985,000 in the year 2000 to more than 1.15 million policies-in-force 
in 2005. 
 
TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF POLICIES-IN-FORCE IN FLORIDA BY OCCUPANCY TYPE, 2000–2005 
OCCUPANCY 
TYPE 
PERCENTAGE 
IN 2005 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2004 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2003 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2002 
PERCENTAGE 
IN 2001 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2000 
Single-family 83.50 83.09 82.82 82.51 82.01 81.27 
2- to 4-family 4.45 4.58 4.66 4.69 4.81 4.94 
Other residential 7.82 8.03 8.27 8.56 9.01 9.69 
Nonresidential 4.22 4.29 4.26 4.24 4.18 4.11 
 
Market Penetration by County 
The number of single-family, residential policies-in-force per household provides a 
measure of market penetration. Unfortunately, data are not available on the number of structures 
located in floodplains for each county, so a rough estimate of the take-up rate must be done using 
total population from the 2000 Census. The Florida counties with the highest percentage of 
single-family, residential policies-in-force in 2005 were Franklin (67 percent), Monroe (66 
percent), Charlotte (41 percent), Lee (39 percent), and Broward (39 percent) counties (see Figure 
1). The counties with the lowest percentage of policies were Gadsden (0.005 percent), Liberty 
(0.005 percent), Jackson (0.006 percent), Madison (0.01 percent), and Washington (0.01 
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percent). Not surprisingly, given the hurricane risk in Florida, those counties with the highest 
take-up rates are located on the coast.  
  
FIGURE 1. TOP FIVE FLORIDIAN COUNTIES IN TERMS OF MARKET PENETRATION IN 2005 
 
 
One can also examine the rankings of counties using the total exposure for the NFIP 
rather than the number of policies-in-force. The counties with the greatest total amount of 
exposure (building and contents coverage minus building and contents deductibles) for single-
family policies in 2005 were: Broward ($58 billion), Miami–Dade ($40.9 billion), Palm Beach 
($21.3 billion), Lee ($17.1 billion), and Pinellas ($13.3 billion). The counties with the most 
policies-in-force were the same counties with the greatest amount of total coverage. They were 
not, however, the counties with the highest market penetration. The five counties with the lowest 
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amounts of total exposure were: Madison ($8.85 million), Jefferson ($6.78 million), Hamilton 
($6.05 million), Union ($4.04 million) and Liberty ($1.69 million). 
 
Market Penetration by Flood Zone 
The number of policies-in-force also varies by FEMA mapped risk zone. As already 
stated, we would ideally like to be able to look at take-up rate by flood zone. Unfortunately, no 
dataset of the number of households in each flood zone by county is available. From our data, 
however, we do have the number of policies-in-force in each flood zone (Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL POLICES-IN-FORCE IN FLORIDA BY 
FLOOD ZONE 
FLOOD ZONE* PERCENTAGE 
IN 2005 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2004 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2003 
PERCENTAGE
IN 2002 
PERCENTAGE 
IN 2001 
PERCENTAG
E IN 2000 
X 17.90 15.15 14.89 15.31 15.62 15.39 
A-A99 17.36 18.74 19.64 20.30 20.89 21.71 
AE 32.22 32.80 32.30 31.77 31.56 31.78 
AHB 22.17 22.99 18.34 20.13 20.07 19.77 
AO, AOB, AH  2.26 2.55 6.81 4.3 3.52 2.64 
V-VE .94 1.04 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.23 
B, C, D 7.15 6.73 6.93 7.05 7.17 7.44 
*See text for explanation of flood zone categories.  A full definition of each NFIP zone is available at: 
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/fhm/fq_gen13.shtm 
 
The A zones (shaded in Table 3) are FEMA-designated 100-year floodplains where the 
mandatory purchase requirement applies. The subcategories within the A designations (A-A99; 
AE; AHB; and AO, AOB, and AH) refer to whether a detailed hydraulic analysis has been done, 
and if so, the particular nature of the flooding. Not surprisingly, about 75 percent of all single-
family policies in Florida are located in these 100-year floodplains. V zones are also in the 100-
year floodplain and the mandatory purchase requirement applies, but they are coastal floodplains 
that are associated with a risk of storm surge. Quite surprisingly to us, given that Florida is 
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highly exposed to hurricane risk, very few policies were in the V zones. This could be because 
they cover a very small geographic area. 
Zone B designates moderate flood risk, and Zone C designates minimal flood risk. Both 
areas are outside of the 100-year floodplain. Zone D consists of areas with possible flood risks, 
but no analysis has been completed on these areas. These three zones represent only a small 
percentage of policies in Florida. Flood Zone X is composed of those areas determined to be 
outside of the 100-year and 500-year floodplains, and thus designates minimal flood risk. About 
18 percent of all residential, single-family policies-in-force were in Zone X in 2005, up from 
15.4 percent in 2000. The mandatory purchase requirement does not apply in Zones B, C, D, or 
X, but if a property owner’s community is participating in the NFIP they may still purchase 
insurance at rates lower than those for the 100-year floodplain.  
 
Market Penetration by Community Rating Systems (CRS) Class 
We also examined how policies broke down across CRS levels. The deduction in 
premiums that a community can receive by participating in the CRS and undertaking mitigating 
activities—such as improved storm water management, land use regulations, or outreach 
campaigns—ranges from 0 to 45 percent of the full actuarial rate (as defined by FEMA), 
depending on the level of actions taken. Table 4 shows how policies-in-force break down by 
CRS class. In 2005, about a quarter of residential policies-in-force were in communities with no 
CRS discount. The remaining three-quarters of policies benefitted from some type of price 
discount ranging from 5 to 25 percent. Virtually no policies got a discount higher than 25 
percent.  
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TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE OF RESIDENTIAL POLICIES-IN-FORCE IN FLORIDA BY CRS CLASS 
CRS DISCOUNT Percentage in 2005 
Percentage 
in 2004 
Percentage
in 2003 
Percentage
in 2002 
Percentage 
in 2001 
Percentage 
in 2000 
0% 26.36 23.15 22.97 23.03 23.08 22.20 
5% 5.09 6.83 7.67 10.01 13.84 17.50 
10% 25.24 27.57 28.15 31.62 33.10 35.81 
15% 21.68 20.52 19.68 17.41 25.64 23.90 
20% 8.22 8.64 18.30 17.21 3.79 .09 
25% 13.41 13.29 3.23 .72 .55 .5 
More than 25%11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 4 also shows how these percentages varied between 2000 and 2005. Over this time 
period, an increasing percentage of policies was receiving no discount, but also, an increasing 
percentage was receiving a 20 or 25 percent discount. For instance, between 2000 and 2002, less 
than 1 percent of the policies were located in communities that received a 25 percent discount on 
their premiums. That proportion significantly increased in the following two years, with more 
than 13 percent of the policies having such a discount in 2005.  
 
Tenure of Flood Policies 
 How long homeowners keep their policies and whether low retention rates can explain 
the lower-than-desired take-up rates in many flood-prone areas in the United States is an open 
question (GAO, 2006). As with other catastrophe risks, homeowners may drop their coverage 
after a certain period if they have not suffered a loss; this has been described as the “natural 
disaster syndrome” (Kunreuther, 1978).  
From our sample, we can track the unique identifying policy number for all of the 
policies-in-force in the year 2000 and see how many of these were still in place in subsequent 
years (Figure 2). In 2000, there were roughly 985,000 single-family, residential policies-in-force. 
                                                 
11 Only a few policies in the dataset are in CRS classes that provide a discount higher than 25 percent. The dataset 
includes 1 such policy (with a 50 percent discount) in 2004, 1 in 2002 (with a 30 percent discount), 35 policies in 
2000 (with a 75 percent discount), and no policies with a discount greater than 25% in 2005, 2003, and 2001. 
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By 2005, only about 38 percent of the policies purchased in 2000 were still in force. This result 
should be viewed with caution, however, since we are unable to determine whether a policy 
dropped from our database because a homeowner moved elsewhere or because a homeowner 
dropped her policy while staying in the same house. 
 
FIGURE 2. TENURE OF POLICIES-IN-FORCE IN 2000 
 
 
 
In conclusion, a more granular analysis of flood insurance policies in Florida reveals 
patterns in flood insurance demand. Like the country overall, the NFIP market in Florida is 
highly concentrated, with just a few counties responsible for the majority of policies and 
coverage. Most of these policies are for single-family homes and, naturally, most of the 
coverage-in-force is located along the coasts and in SFHAs. That said, almost 20 percent of 
homeowners are buying insurance outside of the mandatory purchase areas. Retention appears to 
be a problem in Florida, but we do not know for sure whether a policy is terminated because the 
homeowner relocates or whether s/he decides to stop buying flood insurance. 
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3.2. What type of contracts (deductibles, coverage levels) do policyholders purchase? 
 We now focus more specifically on the design of the flood insurance contract Floridians 
purchase. We first explore the coverage levels that homeowners in Florida choose and then 
examine deductible choices. Finally, we look at how these choices changed in 2005, following 
the active hurricane season and flood surge that affected Florida in 2004; that year, Florida was 
hit with four hurricanes—Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne—as well as tropical storm Bonnie. 
 
Coverage Levels 
The amount of insurance that homeowners can purchase from the NFIP has evolved over 
time. The NFIP has always had two maximum coverage limits, one for the structure and one for 
the contents. In 1968 they were $17,500 and $5,000, respectively for residential property, and 
have since been modified several times. This maximum has remained unchanged since 1994 at 
$250,000 for the structure and $100,000 for contents.12 Homeowners affected by the mandatory 
purchase requirement also must meet a minimum coverage level: the principal remaining on the 
outstanding mortgage (unless this amount is above the maximum coverage limit).     To compare 
the evolution of the real value of this maximum, we indexed the current total limit for building 
and contents coverage of $350,000 to 2008 prices. Figure 3 depicts this 2008-index total policy 
limit over the period 1968–2008 using the official U.S. inflation rate for each year. In real prices, 
the maximum limit on a flood policy in 2008 was about the same as it was 20 years before and 
much lower where it was in 1978, despite significant inflation over this period and despite real 
estate prices that increased in many areas at a much higher rate than inflation. Over the years, 
some have argued that the $350,000 coverage limit is too low. This concern was raised again 
                                                 
12 Commercial (nonresidential) buildings are eligible for up to $500,000 in building coverage and up to $500,000 on 
personal property. According to FEMA, as of June 2007, nearly 2 million of the 5.4 million policies-in-force had 
building coverage only, 3.4 million had both building and content coverage, and 100,000 had content coverage only. 
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following Hurricane Katrina. With our data, we were able to gauge whether that $350,000 
threshold really constitutes a limitation on the demand side for homeowners in Florida. 
 
FIGURE 3. FLOOD TOTAL COVERAGE LIMITS BY YEAR INDEXED TO 2008 DOLLARS 
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Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
After considering all policies-in-force in Florida in 2005, we conclude that the limit is not 
binding for the majority of homeowners. More specifically, we find that about 73 percent of 
single-family homes had building coverage below the $250,000 limit in 2005.13 Given that the 
median value of owner-occupied housing units in Florida reported in the 2000 Census was only 
$105,000, this result should not be surprising. Although much media attention has been paid to 
the multimillion dollar houses on the beach, the majority of residences in Florida are valued at 
less than the NFIP building coverage limit for residential properties.14 Further, flood damages 
                                                 
13 Note that we are looking at the amount of coverage purchased here and not coverage as a percentage of home 
value.  
14 Moreover, in many areas in Florida, it is likely that property prices are heavily determined by the price of the land 
more than the cost of the house itself.  
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may not always completely destroy a structure, so not insuring the full value of the home may be 
quite rational (see Figure 5).   
 
FIGURE 4. BUILDING AND CONTENTS COVERAGE FOR SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES IN FLORIDA 
FOR 2005 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the percentage of the 1.14 million single-family flood policies in 2005 
that selected a given limit for building and contents coverage.  Although almost three-quarters of 
homeowners did not purchase building insurance at the coverage limit, about 27 percent did 
(Figure 4, left). Presumably many of these policyholders would welcome the option of choosing 
a higher limit.15 Moreover, the number and proportion of policyholders who have purchased the 
$250,000 limit has been growing steadily. In 2000, only around 10 percent of single-family 
policyholders were at the coverage maximum limit. This percentage rose in 2003 to 17 percent 
                                                 
15 Not surprisingly, several private insurers, including AIG and Chubb, offer private insurance in excess of the NFIP 
policy limits. However, the same problems of insurability that the NFIP was set up to deal with affect private 
programs. To our knowledge, AIG and Chubb only offer coverage in a handful of states, none of which are Gulf 
Coast states (Silverman, 2005; Best’s Review, 2006). RAND recently examined the market of private flood 
insurance, estimating that between 130,000 and 190,000 policies are entirely from private companies and perhaps 
180,000–260,000 policies are just for coverage in excess of the NFIP cap (Dixon et al., 2007).  Compared to the 5.7 
million NFIP policies-in-force, this is quite a small number.  
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and to 27 percent in 2005. In part, this reflects the growth of Florida’s population over this time 
period and the increased value of the real estate.  
About 23 percent of single-family policies in Florida in 2005 were at the $100,000 limit 
for contents coverage—very close to the 27 percent number at the building coverage limit 
(Figure 4, right). Out of all the 1.14 million single-family policies-in-force in 2005, roughly 12.5 
percent had zero contents coverage. The number with zero contents coverage has been declining 
slowly since 2000, however, whereas the number at the coverage limit rose substantially over 
this time, from 7.5 percent in 2000 to almost 23 percent in 2005.  
 These state averages mask considerable county-level variability in whether policyholders 
are up against the maximum coverage limit. In 2005, some counties, such as Liberty and 
Lafayette Counties, had virtually no policyholders at the limit, whereas in other counties, such as 
Walton, Nassau, Collier, and Martin Counties, half or more of the policyholders were at the 
limit. Over time, more counties are finding more policyholders at the coverage limit. In 2000, the 
counties with the highest percentages of policies at the limit had only about 25 percent at the 
limit (these were Indian River, Walton, and Martin Counties), whereas in 2005, the highest 
percentages were more than 50 percent. Given these results, there would certainly be a demand 
for a higher limit of flood insurance coverage in these counties.  
As expected, policyholders with higher levels of building coverage tend to have higher 
levels of contents coverage, as well. On average over the entire state, there is approximately a 70 
percent chance that a policyholder will buy the maximum limit of contents coverage if she has 
bought the maximum limit of building coverage. Also as expected, the percentage of single-
family, residential policyholders at the limit at the county level in 2000 is positively correlated 
with income measures from the 2000 Census, such as the median value of owner-occupied 
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housing and median income. We calculated that the correlation coefficient is approximately 0.6 
for both measures; this is statistically different from zero at better than the 1 percent level. Both 
the median value of owner-occupied housing and median income are significant predictors in 
county-level regressions with the percentage of policies at the coverage limit as the dependent 
variable (not reported; available from the authors).  
Another important element to consider in making decisions about flood insurance 
coverage is the level of losses policyholders can expect from a flood.16 About three-quarters of 
the residential claims in our dataset between 2000 and 2006 included information on the assessed 
value of the house. For this subsample, Figure 5 shows the amount of the claim paid divided by 
the value of the structure.17 We see that most building claims payments were significantly less 
than the value of the property.18 For just over 50 percent of the claims, the amount paid was no 
more than 10 percent of the property value.  
FIGURE 5. RESIDENTIAL CLAIMS IN FLORIDA BETWEEN 2000 AND 2006 DIVIDED  
BY VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
 
                                                 
16 We thank one of the referees for helpful suggestions on this point. 
17 Approximately 12 percent of the observations had a claim payment of zero and a few were greater than the value 
of the property. These are not included in Figure 5.  
18 Contents claims are not included in Figure 5 because the value of contents was not available. 
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In examining the ratio of claims paid to coverage purchased for residential claims in 
Florida between 2000 and 2006 (Figure 6), we find a similar story. For roughly half of the 
observations, the claim paid was 8 percent or less of the amount of coverage purchased. Taken 
together, Figures 5 and 6 indicate that choosing to insure up to a maximum that is below the 
value of the property is a rational choice for most homeowners. 
 
FIGURE 6. RESIDENTIAL CLAIMS IN FLORIDA BETWEEN 2000 AND 2006 DIVIDED BY 
PURCHASED COVERAGE 
 
Deductible 
In addition to coverage levels, homeowners can choose their deductible. The NFIP offers 
policyholders a choice of six deductibles under which policyholders retain the full loss: $500, 
$1,000, $2,000, $3,000, $4,000, and $5,000. NFIP premiums are calculated by multiplying the 
coverage limit chosen minus the deductible by the cost per $1 of coverage (based on 
characteristics of the house), and then multiplying again by a deductible factor. If a homeowner 
chooses the lowest deductible for both contents and building coverage, the deductible factor is 1. 
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Choosing a $1,000 deductible for both gives a deductible factor of 0.96. Choosing a $5,000 
deductible for both gives a deductible factor of 0.74. So choosing the highest deductible reduces 
costs of NFIP insurance by about 25 percent. Out of all claims filed in Florida through August 
31, 2006, a little more than half of the claims paid were greater than the highest deductible of 
$5,000. 
Many studies on insurance choice have found that individuals prefer low-deductible 
policies, even when these are financially unappealing because of the higher prices charged to 
cover the cost of processing small claims and to combat adverse selection. This preference has 
been found for automobile insurance and homeowners policies (Eldred, 1980; Cutler and 
Zeckhauser, 2004; Sydnor, 2006). The samples in these studies were relatively modest, however. 
Here, we are able to look at deductible choices based on a much larger sample than has been 
studied before in the literature. We find that, of the more than 1 million flood insurance policies-
in-force in 2005, 98.3 percent of customers chose a deductible lower than the maximum one 
available. Almost 80 percent of policyholders chose the lowest possible building deductible, 
$500, and around 18 percent chose the second-lowest deductible available, $1000. Overall, these 
percentages were largely constant for the other 6 million policies we analyzed over the 2000–
2005.  For contents coverage, the deductible choices were similar, with about 83 percent of 
single-family policies having a deductible of $500 in 2005 and 15 percent choosing $1,000.   
 An interesting difference becomes apparent if one examines the deductible choice by 
flood zone. Homeowners inside SFHAs (100-year floodplains) did not choose the lowest 
deductible as often as those outside SFHAs and were also more likely to choose the highest 
deductible offered (see Figure 7). One explanation for this finding is that more policyholders 
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inside SFHAs are being forced to insure by their lender due to the mandatory purchase 
requirement and are thus simply trying to minimize costs by choosing a higher deductible.  
FIGURE 7. CHOICE OF DEDUCTIBLE BY FLOOD ZONE 
 
Still, overall, most homeowners prefer low deductibles, consistent with the findings of 
previous studies. Several factors might explain the choice of a low deductible, and unfortunately, 
in the absence of interviews of buyers of flood coverage, we are unable to tease apart these 
competing explanations. First, consumers might want to cover as much potential damage as 
possible (risk aversion). They do not act rationally by evaluating expected losses, but rather 
assess risk in a binary way: “I suffer a loss or I don’t; but if I do, I want to be sure my investment 
in insurance protection gets me as much as possible back.” Second, some homeowners might not 
be aware that higher deductibles are offered. Third, for some customers who are forced to buy 
flood insurance by lenders, a low deductible means that the insurer will make payments to 
customers more often. Even though such payments may not be a valid indication of a company's 
reliability, they may at least increase confidence in the company’s promise of protection against 
unlikely large losses. Small claims might help make the payment of required insurance more 
tangible. Fourth, some individuals may see insurance as an investment, rather than a risk-
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spreading tool and want to collect something back from their policy. The lowest possible 
deductible will make them more likely to collect as much as possible (Kunreuther, 1978). 
We tested the hypothesis that people with the highest limit would tend to also have a 
higher deductible on their policies.19 This would be consistent with some individuals choosing to 
insure against catastrophic losses but not small losses. The analysis reveals, however, that this is 
not the case. To the contrary, we find that people who bought the coverage limit were more 
likely to choose the lowest possible deductible: in 2005 nearly 81 percent of policyholders with 
the maximum $250,000 limit also had the lowest possible deductible, versus nearly 73 percent 
for policies with a limit lower than $100,000 for building coverage (see Table 5; results similar 
for previous years). The number and proportion choosing the $500 deductible increased with 
higher amounts of contents coverage. This suggests that individuals are trying to receive the 
maximum payout from their insurance or cover both small losses and catastrophic ones.  
 
TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF POLICYHOLDERS CHOOSING THE GIVEN DEDUCTIBLE 
FOR VARYING AMOUNTS OF BUILDING COVERAGE IN 2005 
Building 
Coverage 
Deductible 
0 – 
$50,000 
$50,000 – 
$100,000 
$100,000– 
$150,000 
$150,000– 
$200,000 
$200,000– 
$250,000 $250,000 
Total 
policies 
$500 72.5% 72.8% 79.9% 80.9% 82.1% 81.2% 909,077 
$1,000 25.6% 24.3% 17.9% 16.5% 15.1% 14.8% 202,714 
$5,000 1.2% 1.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 2.4% 20,417 
Number of 
Policies 58,099 153,036 270,668 209,988 138,796 313,257 1,143,844 
 
Impact of Catastrophes on Consumers’ Choices 
 In 2004, Florida was hit by four hurricanes and one tropical storm. This was the first 
time in recorded history that Florida had been hit by four hurricanes in one season. These events 
                                                 
19 Results previously published show that policyholders would choose a lower deductible but also a lower limit on 
the policy, focusing mainly on noncatastrophic loss. For instance, in his survey of insurance buyers, Eldred (1980) 
found that 68 percent of the automobile policies and 69 percent of the homeowners policies that had the lowest 
deductible also had liability limits of $25,000 or less, even though insurance professionals and consumer 
publications agreed that a $100,000 personal liability limit was necessary to afford reasonable protection. 
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caused billions of dollars in damages, the evacuation of over 9 million people, and many 
fatalities. We were interested in whether this exceptional year led homeowners to alter their 
flood insurance purchase decisions. We predicted that insurance take-up rates would increase 
after these storms and that perhaps coverage levels would rise, as well. The NFIP does not react 
to any specific local episode by increasing its rates; rather, it sets its rates at a national level, as 
discussed in the next section. As a result, the premiums of NFIP flood policies remained virtually 
the same in Florida before and after this series of storms. Any changes we observe are thus due 
to a reaction to these events and not to a change in the price formula of insurance. 
 Policies-in-force increased in the state of Florida every year between 2000 and 2004, 
but not by more than a couple of percentage points each year. Between 2004 and 2005, however, 
the number of policies-in-force jumped 6 percent. This is suggestive evidence that the storms 
encourage more property owners to purchase flood insurance.    
 It also appears that after the storms more individuals chose the lowest possible building 
deductible of $500. Considering only single-family, residential policies, for those homeowners 
with coverage less than or equal to $50,000, the percentage in the state overall choosing the 
lowest deductible grew by up to a few percentage points consistently each year between 2000 
and 2005. Looking only at Santa Rosa and Escambia Counties, however, where damage from the 
2004 storms was severe, the proportion of policyholders choosing the lowest deductible 
increased much more between 2004 and 2005 than between any other two years from 2000 to 
2004. The percentage with the lowest deductible jumped between 2004 and 2005 by close to 14 
percent in Santa Rosa and roughly 7 percent in Escambia. This same phenomenon was observed 
among those with the highest possible coverage of $250,000.  
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 After the storms, it also appears that single-family, residential policyholders purchased 
a higher limit on their coverage. The percentage of policyholders in the state with coverage less 
than or equal to $150,000 dropped every year between 2000 and 2004, but never by more than 5 
percent per year. Between 2004 and 2005, though, the number fell by 9 percent. At the same 
time, the percentage choosing the highest possible building coverage of $250,000 was growing 
each year. Between 2000 and 2004, the growth was never more than 3 percent per year. Between 
2004 and 2005, it was double that amount at about 6 percent. Mean building coverage in 2004 
was $152,290 for single-family, residential homes and was $164,835 in 2005.  
Several factors might explain these changes: people living in devastated areas and who 
had coverage might have wished post-storm that they had purchased the largest possible 
coverage before being flooded (regret); the floods were a vivid experience, not only for those 
affected but also their neighbors and families, and people, therefore, revised their belief after the 
storms to think flooding was more likely; or the decision to buy more insurance also became 
more appealing because it was viewed as a sound financial investment. 
 
3.3. Where and when are claims paid? 
In this section, we investigate the particular events driving claims, how claims vary 
across counties, and the determinants of the magnitude of claims paid. Figure 8 provides an 
overview of the total amount of claims paid by year in Florida from 1978 to 2005 for all types of 
policies—commercial and residential. All claims are in constant year 2000 dollars. The high 
level of claims from the unusual 2004 season is readily apparent.  
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FIGURE 8. NFIP CLAIMS PAID IN FLORIDA BY YEAR 
 
 
As discussed above, the NFIP does not cover wind damage from hurricanes (this 
coverage is provided by private insurers through homeowners policies or through state insurance 
pools), but major hurricanes in coastal states typically also induce significant flood losses from 
storm surge pushing water inland, or from flooding induced by torrential rains as hurricanes 
move inland. For these reasons, hurricanes are responsible for the majority of NFIP claims in 
Florida. For example, in 2004, 15 percent of NFIP claims in Florida were attributable to 
Hurricane Charlie, 17 percent to Hurricane Frances, 36 percent to Hurricane Ivan, and 18 percent 
to Hurricane Jeanne—a total of 86 percent of flood claims. In 2005, more than 50 percent of all 
claims payments were associated with Hurricane Wilma and just under a quarter were associated 
with Hurricane Katrina. Another 13 percent of claims were due to Hurricane Dennis—a total of 
88 percent of the claims for that year.  
Mean claim payments in Florida between 2000 and 2005 were about $3,000 higher for V 
flood zones—floodplains associated with wave action—than for A flood zones. This suggests 
that storm surge or other coastal flooding associated with wave action inflicts higher levels of 
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damage than inland flooding from heavy rain. This is consistent with the higher NFIP premiums 
charged in V zones. Coverage levels, however, are not much different across the zones, although 
we are unable to control for all factors that influence coverage levels to make an accurate 
determination.  
We also examined which counties generated the highest amount of flood insurance 
claims between 2000 and 2005. Rather than looking at the total value of reimbursements (a 
county with many more policies will receive more payments, all else being equal), we examined 
the average insurance claim per policy in each county. For certain counties, this figure is quite 
high indeed: $44,017 for Santa Rosa County, $34,954 for Escambia, and $10,259 for Monroe 
County. The other eight counties in the top 10 are as follows: Wakulla ($8,868), Okaloosa 
($7,366), Franklin ($5,481), Baker ($3,499), Gilchrist ($3,083), De Soto ($3,035), and Walton 
($2,640).20 Santa Rosa and Escambia counties, located in the far northwest of Florida (see Figure 
1), both suffered severe losses from the 2004 hurricane season. Flood claims for Santa Rosa were 
about $350 million, or about 30 percent of the total flood coverage in the county; Escambia 
claims were $260 million, or 25 percent of its entire coverage. This came as a surprise since only 
about 35 percent (Santa Rosa) and 40 percent (Escambia) of flood policies are located in a 100-
year floodplain in these two counties. This raises the question of what determines the magnitude 
of NFIP claims, which we turn to in the next section.  
 
Determinants of Claims Payments  
The current debate about the future of the NFIP is mainly focused on how to make the 
program more sustainable over the long term so that taxpayers are not held financially 
                                                 
20 Miami–Dade was ranked 23rd with an average of $929 in claims per policy over this period of time; Palm Beach 
was 59th with $148.  
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responsible for those living in high-risk areas. To shed light on this debate and make concrete 
recommendations as to how the operation of the program can be improved (see section 4), we 
used the data on single-family NFIP claims between 2000 and 2005 to uncover the key drivers of 
claims payments in Florida.  
In this analysis, we consider two dependent variables: the magnitude of a claim divided 
by the amount of coverage purchased, and the magnitude of a claim divided by the recorded 
property value.21 Our individual variables are somewhat limited by the data available, but we 
were able to examine several factors considered relevant including location, mitigation, and 
community policies.  We look at the influence of the structural characteristics of a house that 
could reduce damages, such as having more stories, having a basement, and being elevated, as 
well as the impact of riskier locations—whether the home is located in a 100-year floodplain. 
Finally, we assessed the impact of community flood mitigation measures by including a variable 
for the CRS class of the community in which the property was located. Information on current 
CRS class for each community in Florida is on the FEMA website and this was merged into our 
claims data. CRS classes range from 1 to 9 (communities not participating are in class 10); each 
class carries with it a 5 percent discount in premiums with class 1 receiving the maximum 
reduction (i.e., a 45 percent discount) and class 9 receiving only a 5 percent discount. 
Communities can improve their class ranking by adopting a range of policies that reduce flood 
losses, improve awareness of flood risk, and/or facilitate accurate insurance ratings. 
Unfortunately, data were missing for one or more variables for some of the observations, 
                                                 
21 As stated earlier, the value of the home was only available for about 75% of claims. 
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reducing the sample size somewhat. Still, after cleaning the data,22 more than 40,000 
observations remained. Summary information on the variables is presented in Table 6. 
 
TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF DETERMINANTS OF CLAIMS DATA 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Claims/property value 0.218 0.268 ~0 1 
Claims/coverage 0.196 0.256 ~0 1 
CRS class 7.01 1.63 523 10 
More than 1 floor 0.273 0.446 0 1 
Building elevated 0.218 0.413 0 1 
Basement  0.075 0.264 0 1 
SFHA 0.856 0.351 0 1 
 
 Simple ordinary least squares regressions were run on these data. Fixed effects for year, 
county, and catastrophe number (unique identifying numbers given to named catastrophes, such 
as hurricanes) were included. Although this should control for many potential influences on 
claims, the results should be interpreted with a degree of caution because of potential omitted 
variable bias. Results are presented in Table 7, with robust Huber–White standard errors in 
parentheses. Column I shows the results with the natural log of claims over property value as the 
dependent variable, and column II gives the results of the natural log of claims over coverage as 
the dependent variable.24 
 
 
                                                 
22 For many claims, the payment was recorded as zero. These claims could have been closed without payment or the 
information was missing; they were not included in the regressions. Also, 25 observations had claims larger than 
coverage levels; these were dropped. Finally, just under 2 percent of claims had claim amounts entered that were 
larger than the value of the property. For these, the value of claims over coverage was set equal to one. 
23 Although in theory communities could have a lower CRS class, it appears that no community in Florida has 
achieved a CRS rating better than 5. 
24 We appreciate insightful suggestions on this regression by an anonymous referee.  
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TABLE 7. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 Expected sign I 
ln(Claims/property value) 
II 
ln(Claims/coverage) 
Variable  Coefficient Coefficient 
CRS class + 0.1614*** 
(0.0097) 
0.1426*** 
(0.0067) 
More than 1 floor – -0.5676*** 
(0.0227) 
-0.5498*** 
(0.0185) 
Building elevated – -0.5434*** 
(0.0234) 
-0.6837*** 
(0.0219) 
Basement  +/– -0.0784** 
(0.0356) 
-0.0222 
(0.0340) 
SFHA + 0.1985*** 
(0.0293) 
0.1832*** 
(0.0219) 
FE: Year, catastrophe 
number, county 
 Y Y 
R-squared  0.1567 0.1828 
N  42,573 42,573 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10 percent level are marked with *, those 
significant at the 5 percent level are marked with **, and those significant at the 1 percent level are designated by ***. 
 
 All signs are as predicted. The most striking result is the highly significant coefficient on 
the CRS class variable. As a community adopts mitigating measures, it moves up in the CRS 
ranking and achieves a lower CRS class (so, a higher CRS class number implies less mitigation). 
Our results suggest that claims as a percentage of value or coverage increase by around 15 
percent for a one-level increase in CRS class. More intuitively, mitigation pays: as communities 
adopt mitigating activities, claims decrease. This result is important because we have not been 
able to find such local evidence of CRS effectiveness in the literature.  
Other coefficients are also as predicted. Homes with more floors have lower claims, 
probably because damage does not affect the entire structure. Claims are much higher in the 
riskiest areas—100-year floodplains (or SFHAs)—by just under 20 percent, whether as a 
percentage of value or of coverage. Claims are also lower for buildings with basements, 
potentially because in many cases, basements alone flood, leading homeowners to file small 
claims (there are limitations on what the NFIP will cover in basements). When a building is 
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elevated, claims as a percentage of home value fall by almost 55 percent and claims as a 
percentage of coverage fall by just under 70 percent; this is, by far, the most important driver of 
claim reduction and shows, again, that proper risk reduction measures can substantially reduce 
damages.   
 In our dataset, each claim includes a number indicating the catastrophe that caused the 
loss. As already stated, fixed effects for these events were included in the regression. Although 
not reported individually in Table 7, Hurricanes Ivan, Frances, and Charley all were associated 
with highly significant increases in claims in both specifications, as were tropical storms Allison 
and Gabrielle. The only catastrophe that led to statistically significant lower claims was October 
flooding in 2001. This would suggest that hurricane-related water damage in Florida has been 
more severe than non-hurricane flooding. 
 
3.4. How are prices determined and how much does NFIP insurance cost in Florida? 
 The NFIP’s goals with regard to setting prices differ from those of a private insurance 
company because the NFIP does not have to seek a profit, nor must its prices reflect the cost of 
capital. With its pricing strategy, the NFIP not only seeks financial soundness, but also aims to 
support floodplain management and encourage widespread adoption of flood insurance with its 
pricing strategy (Hayes et al., 2007). As discussed above, certain properties are offered 
subsidized rates, whereas others are charged the full-risk premium. Because just under a quarter 
of all policies are subsidized, the entire program cannot be actuarially sound. The goal of the 
NFIP regarding its pricing is thus not fiscal solvency, but the collection of enough premiums to 
cover the operating expenses and losses associated with the historic average loss year (Hayes et 
al., 2007).   
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This was more or less maintained until 2005; over the life of the program, losses resulting 
from Hurricane Katrina were truly exceptional.25 FEMA has decided currently to give a 1 
percent weight to the 2005 claims when determining the historic average loss year, while seeking 
advice on an appropriate weighting going forward (Hayes et al., 2007). The NFIP has borrowing 
authority from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and at the end of 2007, it had borrowed $17 
billion, largely as a result of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons. Current revenue is unlikely to 
be sufficient to cover its operating expenses and claims as well as interest and principal 
payments to the Treasury (GAO 2008a). Some determination will have to be made regarding 
how the NFIP will repay these costs or whether the federal government will assume the costs of 
catastrophe years. 
“Actuarial” premiums set by FEMA are based first on the determination of the flood risk 
zones. Rates are then set for each flood zone for the nation as a whole; rates for similar flood 
zones are the same everywhere in the country. The formula the NFIP uses to calculate the 
actuarial rates is described in the yearly rate reviews. 26 The minimum rate is $0.16 per $100 of 
building coverage. To set rates for subsidized properties, the total amount of actuarial premiums 
                                                 
25Between 1968 and July 2005, the program’s revenue was $23.6 billion and its total insurance expenses were $24.3 
billion ($16.5 billion in claims payments and $7.4 billion paid to private insurers that participate as financial 
intermediaries in the WYO program but do not bear any risk). In addition, the program spent $2.2 billion on 
administrative expenses. Taken altogether, after 37 years of operation, the cumulative result was a deficit of about 
$3 billion (Wharton Risk Center, 2008).  In contrast, the 2005 hurricanes led to NFIP liabilities of around $23 
billion.  
 
26 Taken from the 2008 Actuarial Rate Review (Hayes and Spafford, 2008), the NFIP formula for calculating rates 
is: 
 
 
EXLOSS
UNISDEDLADJDELVPELVRate ****  
PELV gives the probability of water reaching a certain height, relative to the base flood elevation. This is calculated 
for many different potential heights based on engineering and hydrological analyses. Elevations are rounded to the 
nearest foot. Events rarer than the 350- to 500-year event are not considered because FEMA notes that it is difficult 
to estimate extremely rare events. DELV gives the ratio of flood damage to the value of the property. FEMA 
assesses this ratio from tables that relate depth of water to damage. The tables are checked by FEMA against actual 
claim data. LADJ is a loss adjustment factor given as a percentage of losses. It is currently 4.12 percent and covers 
the cost of payment loss adjuster fees and special claim investigations. DED is the deductible offset. UNIS is a 
factor to adjust the DELV values for the fact that most people underinsure. Finally, EXLOSS is a loading factor for 
insurance agent commissions and other expenses; in non-V zones, it is 10 percent and in V zones it is 20 percent. 
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the NFIP expects to collect is subtracted from the historical average loss year to determine a 
target amount of revenue that subsidized properties must generate.  Rates also vary by certain 
characteristics of the house, such as its height above base flood elevation. NFIP rates are revised 
once a year in May. By law, any yearly increase in premiums cannot exceed 10 percent overall.  
 This pricing strategy clearly leads to important cross-subsidizations in the program. Rates 
are not risk-based at the local level, so prices will be “too high” in some areas and “too low” in 
others. The GAO notes this problem that rates do not reflect local topographical conditions and 
finds that a look at historical claim and premium data suggests that NFIP rates are not always 
reflections of the risk (GAO 2008a). Without a detailed analysis of expected losses in various 
locations, however, it is impossible to say if and how much the prices of NFIP policies may 
deviate from true risk-based rates. The GAO has further criticized some aspects of the NFIP 
pricing strategy. Some of the data used are outdated, such as estimates of flood probabilities that 
are from the 1980s, and some data are inaccurate, such as damage estimates that do not reflect 
the full amount of NFIP claim experience (GAO 2008a).  
The NFIP’s pricing strategy of basing rates on a historical average loss year does not 
leave room for anticipation of changes in future conditions. With the long delay in updating 
maps (as of April 2008, close to two-thirds of the maps were more than 10 years old [GAO 
2008a]), even without climate change, risk designations are often outdated because of changes in 
development that in some places have dramatically altered the risk. This leads to rates that do not 
reflect risk, potentially sending misleading signals to property owners.  
The 2008 Rate Review gives the average premium for different flood zones. The actuarial 
rates (nonsubsidized properties) are shown in Table 8. It is clear from the table that, although the 
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V zones along the coast represent a very small percentage of business, the risks of flood damage 
in these areas, and thus the rates for these zones, are much higher. 
TABLE 8: NFIP ACTUARIAL AVERAGE PREMIUMS 
Zone Percentage of business 
Average annual premium as of May 2008 
(US$) 
AE,A,AO,AH,AOB,AHB 39.6% 429.92 
POST-81 V,VE 0.9% 2,270.27 
B,C,X  37.3% 394.34 
Source: Hayes and Spafford (2008). 
 
Since rates are set by zone for the entire country, variations in the average premium 
across geographic areas reflect differences in the percentage of homes located in different flood 
zones, the structure of the home (basement, elevation, etc.), or the nature of the policy (selected 
deductible and limit). When looking at the average premium paid per $1000 of coverage in 
Florida in 2005, the cost ranges from $1.30 in Flagler County to $7.50 in Dixie County, with a 
mean of $2.79 and a median of $2.50. Interestingly, the counties in which the cost of insurance 
was the most expensive are not necessarily those with the highest proportion of policies in 
SFHAs: more than 50 percent of policies in Palm Beach, Broward, and Santa Rosa Counties 
were in these high-risk zones, but these are among the counties with the lowest average cost of 
flood insurance. Variations in average cost must therefore be due to differences in the types of 
homes insured and the coverage and deductible chosen by homeowners.  
In looking at the change in the average premium per $1,000 of coverage between 2000 
and 2005, we find that not only did this not increase, but it significantly decreased in all but two 
of the 67 counties in Florida. Surprisingly, the decline in cost is even more severe when one 
considers Santa Rosa and Escambia counties. As we analyze above, these two counties suffered 
the most damage from the 2004 hurricanes. Further, these two counties also saw a significant 
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increase in the proportion of flood policies located in high-risk areas (data not reported here). 
Nevertheless, the average cost of flood insurance in Santa Rosa decreased from $2.27 per $1,000 
of flood coverage in 2000 to $1.60 in 2005 (i.e., a 29 percent decrease); in Escambia County, the 
cost decreased from $2.85 per $1,000 of flood coverage in 2000 to $1.91 in 2005 (a 33 percent 
decrease). We know from the NFIP rate reviews that premiums for many of the zones increased 
somewhat—rather than decreased—over this time period. So what is driving the drop in average 
prices? 
Although this decline in average cost per $1,000 might seem counterintuitive, there are 
several explanations. First, more single-family homeowners outside of floodplains in these two 
counties purchased policies between 2000 and 2005 (possibly because, regardless of whether you 
live in a 100-year floodplain, a flood close to you is a vivid reminder of your possible exposure), 
and these are the lowest-cost policies. In Escambia, the percentage of policies outside of 100-
year floodplains grew from 36 percent in 2000 to 60.2 percent in 2005. In Santa Rosa, the 
percentage grew from 46.8 percent to 65.2 percent. As a result, the average cost per $1,000 of 
coverage throughout each of these counties decreased. Second, there was a relative decline in the 
proportion of policies in the most expensive V zones. For Escambia, the percentage of policies in 
V zones dropped from 6.2 percent in 2000 to 3.1 percent in 2005. In Santa Rosa, the percentage 
of policies in V zones fell from 4.3 percent in 2000 to 2.7 percent in 2005. This also has driven 
down the average cost in each county. Finally—and this had a stronger effect on lowering the 
average insurance cost—homeowners in these counties significantly increased their coverage 
levels between 2000 and 2005. The pricing formula described above is not linear in dollars of 
coverage because the probability of suffering the first $X of loss is higher than the probability of 
suffering $2X of loss. In Escambia, the mean building coverage for single-family, residential 
  41
policies increased from $130,822 in 2000 to $171,233 in 2005—a large 31 percent increase. In 
Santa Rosa, it increased from $137,967 to $186,496—an increase of 35 percent. Therefore, 
although individuals are more protected and might be paying more in absolute terms, the average 
cost per $1,000 of coverage decreased significantly after the 2004 floods in these two counties. 
 
4. Conclusion and Possible Improvements to the NFIP 
This paper has provided an overview of both the functioning of the NFIP at a national 
level and a close look at policies and claims in the state of Florida, which has the largest share of 
NFIP policies and coverage-in-force. We hope that these results will contribute to a better 
microeconomic understanding of the market for flood insurance in the United States. This is an 
important issue because flood losses have been accelerating over the past 15 years, largely due to 
more and more people locating in high-risk areas. The NFIP has also seen a significant change in 
the scope of its operation over these past 15 years. From 1992 to 2007, it has grown from 2.5 
million policies to more than 5.5 million, from $800 million in premiums collected from 
policyholders to $2.6 billion, and from covering $237 billion in value at risk to more than $1 
trillion—increases of 120, 225, and 320 percent, respectively.  
Some of our findings are in accordance with well-documented expectations on 
homeowners’ decisionmaking regarding insurance purchasing and the functioning of the NFIP. 
Other findings, however, revealed some common misconceptions. The extreme concentration of 
the NFIP market in a few states is somewhat surprising because one may expect flood risk to be 
spread more broadly across the country. It may be one more indication of the trend toward 
increased capital and people in coastal areas. The NFIP is also concentrated within Florida such 
that the highest concentration of coverage and policies-in-force is on the coasts. Since this is the 
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area of highest hurricane risk, the main flooding threat in the state, this is understandable.  With 
the high concentration of the NFIP portfolio along the Gulf coast, the NFIP has become 
somewhat of a hurricane insurance program, although it does not cover wind damage.   
The massive debt the NFIP now faces from the Hurricane Katrina claims, coupled with 
the pricing strategy discussed here, makes it evident that the NFIP is not designed to be self-
sufficient financially in the aftermath of truly catastrophic losses. This issue requires serious 
consideration as the NFIP comes up for renewal in the autumn of 2009. To limit taxpayer 
liability for damages incurred by those living in the riskiest areas, several changes could be 
implemented. First, prices could be modified to reflect the most recent information about 
exposure, which would probably lead to increases in insurance premiums collected every year by 
the program. Second, FEMA could partner with the private sector or draw on the financial 
markets to access additional capital to address truly catastrophic flooding; this could be done, for 
example, through the issuance of pre- or postevent bonds. Finally, because more than a third of 
every dollar paid by an NFIP policyholder goes to the administrative costs of private insurers 
that do not bear any risk, it would certainly be important for the GAO to analyze whether the 
level of this payment is still justified 40 years after the program’s inception.  
Another important way to make the NFIP more effective would be to focus more heavily 
on risk reduction. Our analysis of claims in Florida clearly indicates that mitigation works. 
Claims are much lower both for elevated homes and, perhaps more importantly from a policy 
perspective, for communities which are taking part in the NFIP’s CRS. The reductions in 
premiums seem to be roughly warranted as communities that adopt mitigating measures do have 
lower claims, all else being equal. To further lower losses, more effort could be put into 
encouraging communities to join this program and to accelerate through the levels. One might 
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also consider household-level premium reductions for property owners who flood-proof their 
homes or businesses.  
Our analysis also provides some evidence that people drop coverage quickly. A more 
radical change to address this problem would be for FEMA to start offering multiyear flood 
insurance contracts rather than the current one-year contracts. Indeed, since the NFIP is managed 
at a federal level, nothing precludes FEMA from issuing 5, 10 or even 20-year flood policies tied 
to the property (rather than to the individual) that would go hand-in-hand with the mortgage; this 
could also make investment in mitigation more attractive over time. For instance, if long-term 
flood insurance policies are in place (rates could be reviewed every 5 or 10 years), FEMA could 
offer 20-year risk reduction loans to its policyholders to incentivize them to reduce their 
exposure to flood. If policyholders can benefit from an annual rebate on their flood insurance 
that is greater than the annual loan payment, this would be a win–win situation for everyone27. 
Finally, in discussions over reforms to the NFIP, the issue of coverage limits is often 
raised. Although some homeowners in Florida might desire higher coverage, the current limit is 
not binding for the majority of homeowners. It has become more binding over time, however, 
suggesting possible demand for an increased limit. The response to the 2004 hurricane season 
also suggests that homeowners may desire more coverage and that this demand will become 
more pronounced if Florida has another devastating hurricane season in the coming years. Excess 
coverage is available through the private market, however, and to the extent that NFIP rates are 
not risk-based, there may be equity concerns in continuing to offer coverage to the wealthiest 
residents. Instead of or in addition to offering more coverage, the NFIP could better connect 
homeowners with private insurers offering higher levels of flood coverage.  
                                                 
27 For more on the possibility of long-term insurance contracts, see: Jaffee et al., 2008; Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan, 2009. 
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